Still, over the past several decades a pair of distinct and broadly opposing views has emerged regarding the relationship between democracy and terrorist attacks. Inquiry into the relationship between dictatorship and terrorism emerged much later. The upshot has been the development of a third view regarding the association between regime types and terrorist attacks. The first holds that liberal-democratic freedoms of association and movement, coupled with due-process safeguards and legal restraints on security forces, make it easier to organize terrorist groups and to plan and carry out attacks.
In a material sense, the means are placed at their disposal by the environment. The third explanation holds that electoral competition and institutional design play key roles in explaining heightened vulnerability to terrorism among certain democracies.
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Between and , three studies found that political systems with higher levels of political competition suffered more terrorist incidents. Since the mids, an opposing view has emerged. This view contends that democracy actually has an antiterrorist effect because democratic openness allows grievances to be peacefully and publicly expressed and redressed, which in turn makes it harder for violent, conspiratorial fringe groups to prosper.
Among its pioneers has been Alberto Abadie, who in suggested that political freedom has a nonlinear effect on terrorism. The relationship that he saw between regime types and terrorism took the form of an inverted U. The latter are distinguished from the former by virtue of holding elections that involve more than one party, though these votes are not competitive enough for the regime to qualify even as minimally democratic. Even if we put aside for the moment the exceptionally high rates of contemporary terrorism in states that score high in state fragility as identified by the Fragile States Index , the GTD figures reveal an enormous increase in the number of terrorist attacks globally over the years from through In fact, during that period terrorist incidents in nonfragile states worldwide grew by 1, percent, going from 1, attacks in to 13, attacks in The number of terrorist events, moreover, rose across all regime types.
The aggregate increase in terrorism is at odds with the decades-long decline in interstate wars, but consistent with the dramatic resurgence of other forms of political violence over the past decade.
The number of minor civil wars involving 25 to battle deaths per year also rose over the same period, with the sharp uptick since largely driven by the expansion of ISIS and its affiliates, which were involved in conflicts in three countries in and at least twelve in The scourge of terrorism is real, yet summary data tell us little about the distribution of attacks or the rates of increase in terrorist incidents across various regime types.
A number of insights can be gleaned from the aggregate trends. Not only are higher-quality democracies less prone to terrorist attacks than all other regime types, but the rate of increase in the number of attacks among such democracies is substantially lower in comparison to the rest. The pattern is maintained even where we exclude any country that is farther than two standard deviations from the subcategory mean, namely the United Kingdom among liberal democracies, and Israel among the polyarchies.
This is all the more striking given the already relatively low levels of terrorist incidents experienced by liberal democracies and polyarchies at the start of the measurement period. It lends support to the minority view in the literature that sees political openness and the protection of civil liberties and the rule of law as assets that facilitate the minimization of terrorism through the airing and redress of grievances; the wide scope granted to peaceful political expression; and the resulting lower legitimacy accorded to violent fringe groups.
Countries possessing intermediate levels of political freedoms, on both the democratic and authoritarian sides of the regime spectrum, do suffer the largest number of terrorist attacks and are substantially more susceptible than regimes that are more free on the democratic side and less free on the authoritarian side.
These intermediate regimes, it seems, cannot match either the grievance-assuaging and cooptation capacities of liberal democracies and polyarchies, or the brutal, no-holds-barred crackdown abilities of hardened autocracies. It should be stressed that only reasonably high-quality democracies with broad civil-liberties guarantees can expect to enjoy the lowest relative levels of terrorism incidents.
Indeed, electoral democracies and since —12 minimalist democracies have experienced sharp increases in the number of terrorist attacks. A greater frequency of terrorist incidents, therefore, can be expected to follow any decline in democratic quality big enough to drop a country below the polyarchy level. Although intermediate levels of political freedoms predict considerably higher rates of terrorism than either high-quality democracies or closed autocracies suffer, significant internal differences between minimalist or electoral democracies and multiparty autocracies have emerged in recent years.
Again, the pattern holds even if we exclude outliers such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. Another recent development that might be important has to do with closed autocracies. The relative safety of closed authoritarian regimes, in this view, stems from their perceived superiority in denying terrorists organizational and mobilization opportunities, despite grievances stemming from the absence of legally permissible political access. In , however, terrorism in closed autocracies began to skyrocket.
By , the number of terrorist attacks in closed autocracies was 7, percent higher than it had been in This was the greatest relative increase among all regime types leaving aside the category of fragile states , and came mostly from attacks in Bahrain, Iran, Kuwait, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan, and to a lesser extent from attacks in Djibouti, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mauritania, and Qatar. As of , closed autocracies were about as prone to suffer terrorist attacks as electoral democracies, and were markedly more prone than either liberal democracies or polyarchies.
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Is this a passing anomaly, or the start of a serious trend? Perhaps closed autocracies will continue to suffer a lower incidence of terrorism than more liberalized ones, but at the same time will be subject to more terror attacks than before, and will suffer more of them than reasonably high-quality democracies endure. The underlying reality may be that closed autocracies are no longer as able as they once were to suppress or coopt violent challengers. Quite possibly, changing technology is a factor. As communications, encryption, 3D printing of weapons, and virtual currencies advance and proliferate to nonstate actors and individuals, terrorists will find it easier to generate and exploit strategic opportunities, while governments—even harsh ones—will find it harder to stop them.
The spike in terror attacks within closed autocracies since may herald the beginning of such a technology-driven shift. In the age of smartphones and social media, moreover, authoritarian regimes can no longer so readily hide terrorism by simply failing to report it as such. Outside of an unusual case such as North Korea, individuals living under authoritarianism have more capacity than before to record and broadcast terror incidents. At the same time, at least some authoritarian regimes may be coming to see an advantage in the franker reporting of terrorism, as it captures the attention of international organizations and Western governments and creates a basis on which authoritarian rulers can hope to win favor as potential recruits in the global fight against violent extremism.
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Liberal democracies and polyarchies benefit from a sizeable and apparently growing democracy advantage in terms of experiencing fewer terrorist incidents compared with all other regime types. In contrast, the average annual number of people killed in closed autocracies—the regime type that the latest scholarship says is virtually equal to high-quality democracy in terms of safety from terrorism—stood at Seller Inventory n.
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Chiron Media Wallingford, United Kingdom. Published by University of Toronto Press, Canada New Hardcover Quantity Available: 1. Upon assuming office on June 30, , Duterte assembled an eclectic cabinet that included law school classmates, long-time associates from Davao, ex-military officers, business leaders, and representatives of the communist left. His diverse coalition came together through personal loyalty, regional affinity, and political opportunism.
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It included many political figures who had been sidelined during the Aquino administration, most notably former president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and members of the Marcos, Estrada, and Villar families. In Davao, he combined a hardline approach to law and order with socially progressive and pro-business policies. As mayor he was both a paternalistic patron and a fearsome boss whose orders had to be followed. As a result, he has little tolerance for scrutiny or challenges to this authority.
He sees the country as beset by existential threats of drugs, crime, and corruption. As befits Philippine culture, his approach is highly personalistic: he presents himself as the only leader strong and decisive enough to save the nation. He may not offer the clearest policy, but he puts forward the sincerest discourse of sympathy. To support these goals, the government has significantly increased spending on infrastructure, raised the salaries of government employees, expanded existing social development programs, revived the stalled peace process with the Moro National Liberation Front MNLF and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front MILF , entered into negotiations with the communist insurgents, and established a closer relationship with China.
Instead, the following sections discuss three policy areas that offer insights into the Duterte administration—economic policymaking, peace and development in Mindanao, and constitutional change—and discuss in greater detail the ongoing war on drugs. Economic policies and performance. As a candidate, Duterte showed little interest in economic policy issues. In , GDP growth was 6. The first package of reforms was signed into law in December ; the second and more controversial package is with Congress.
Inflation has been increasing, averaging 4. Duterte and Mindanao.
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Duterte is the first president from the southern island of Mindanao, and his election was a significant political milestone for the Philippines. Under Duterte, progress on the political and security front has been mixed. This is in large measure due to the May occupation of Marawi City, in Lanao del Sur province, by Islamist extremists affiliated with the self-proclaimed Islamic State. It took five months of combat operations for the Philippine military to regain control over the extensively damaged city. In response to the Marawi crisis Duterte imposed island-wide martial law, which remains in effect.
The government had entered into a series of on-again, off-again talks with the communist insurgency, which still has a significant armed presence in eastern Mindanao.
Currently, the process has stalled and appears unlikely to produce a breakthrough. The BOL is an important step forward, but multiple challenges remain, including possible objections to its constitutionality, a forthcoming plebiscite scheduled for late January and early February , and the actual establishment of the new autonomous entity. The fading prospects for constitutional change. But during most of his first two years in office, he showed limited interest in this complex and contentious issue of federalism. He appointed a twenty-two-member Constitutional Commission, and received its proposed draft constitution in early July The commission suggested eighteen federated regions and kept the directly elected presidency.
Cha-Cha is now in the hands of the Congress. If both houses agree to change the constitution, the revised charter will be subject to a national plebiscite. Over the past year, opposition to both the substance and process of Cha-Cha has grown. Senators are elected in a nationwide constituency, so many of them see federalism as a threat to their political influence and ambitions.
Others criticize the process for being tightly controlled and nonparticipatory. As of December it appears unlikely that Cha-Cha will happen before the May midterm elections. The outcome of these elections—and particularly, the future composition of the Senate—may determine whether Cha-Cha will be revived in the next legislative term.
His nationwide war on drugs has applied the approach that he used in Davao City, giving the police free rein to deal with suspected drug users and pushers with little concern for legal niceties. It also has involved a lesser-noticed campaign against government officials allegedly complicit in the drug trade.